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Abstract—Covert communication can prevent the adversary
from knowing that a wireless transmission has occurred. In
the additive white Gaussian noise channels, a square root law
is obtained and the result shows that Alice can reliably and
covertly transmit O(√n) bits to Bob in n channel uses. If
additional “friendly” node near the adversary can inject artificial
noise to aid Alice in hiding her transmission attempt, covert
throughput can be improved, i.e., Alice can covertly transmit
O(min{n, λα/2√n}) bits to Bob over n uses of the channel (λ is
the density of friendly nodes and α is the path loss exponent
of wireless channels). In this paper, we consider the covert
communication in a noisy wireless network, where Bob and
the adversary Willie not only experience the background noise,
but also the aggregated interference from other transmitters.
Our results show that uncertainty in interference experienced by
Willie is beneficial to Alice. When the distance between Alice
and Willie da,w = ω(n
δ/4) (δ = 2/α is stability exponent),
Alice can reliably and covertly transmit O(log2
√
n) bits to Bob
in n channel uses. Although the covert throughput is lower
than the square root law and the friendly jamming scheme, the
spatial throughput is higher. From the network perspective, the
communications are hidden in “the sound and the fury” of noisy
wireless networks, and what Willie sees is merely a “shadow”
wireless network. He knows for certain that some nodes are
transmitting, but he cannot catch anyone red-handed.
Index Terms—Physical-layer Security; Covert Communica-
tion; Stochastic Geometry; Interference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional cryptography methods for network security can
not solve all security problems. In wireless networks, if a user
wishes to communicate covertly without being detected by
other detectors, encryption to preventing eavesdropping is not
enough [1]. Even if a message is encrypted, the metadata,
such as network traffic pattern, can reveal some sensitive in-
formation [2]. Furthermore, if the adversary cannot detect the
transmission, he has no chance to launch the “eavesdropping
and decoding” attack even if he has boundless computing
and storage capabilities. On other occasions, such as in a
battlefield, soldiers hope to hide their tracks and communicate
covertly. Another occasion, such as defeating “Panda-Hunter”
attack [3], also needs to prevent the adversary from detecting
the transmission behavior of users to protect the location
privacy.
Consider the scenario where a transmitter Alice would like
to communicate with a receiver Bob covertly over a wireless
channel in order to not being detected by a warden Willie.
In [4], Bash et al. found a square root law in additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, that is, Alice can transmit
O(√n) bits reliably and covertly to Bob over n uses of
wireless channels. The square root law implies pessimistically
that the asymptotic privacy rate approaches zero. If Willie
does not know the time of the transmission attempts of Alice,
Alice can reliably transmit O(min{(n logT (n))1/2, n}) bits
to Bob while keeping the Willie’s detector ineffective with a
slotted AWGN channel model containing T (n) slots [5]. To
improve the performance of covert communication, Lee et al.
[6] found that, Willie has measurement uncertainty about its
noise level due to the existence of SNR wall [7], then they
obtained an asymptotic privacy rate which approaches a non-
zero constant. Following Lee’s work, He et al. [8] defined new
metrics to gauge the covertness of communication. They took
the distribution of noise measurement uncertainty into consid-
eration. Wang et al. [9] considered the covert communication
over the discrete memoryless channels (DMC), and found that
the privacy rate scales like the square root of the blocklength.
Bloch et al. [10] discussed the covert communication problem
from a resolvability perspective. He developed an alternative
coding scheme such that, if the warden’s channel statistics
are known, on the order of
√
n reliable covert bits may be
transmitted to Bob over n channel uses with only on the order
of
√
n bits of secret key. Soltani et al. [11] studied the covert
communications on renewal packet channels. They introduced
some information-theoretic limits for covert communication
over packet channels where the packet timings of legitimate
users are governed by a Poisson point process.
Although the research on covert wireless communication
focuses on the transmission capability, it is quite different from
the works that measure the performance of wireless networks
[12] [13]. In general, the covertness of communication is due
to the existence of noise that the adversary cannot accurately
distinguish between the signal and noise. If we can increase
the measurement uncertainty of the adversary, the performance
of covert communication can be improved. Take the following
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Fig. 1. System configuration of covert wireless communication. Alice wishes
to transmit reliably and covertly to Bob. The interferers, or other transmitters
(represented by black circles) are distributed according to a two-dimensional
PPP in the presence of warden Willie (represented by red cross).
occasion as an example,
“One day morning you walked in the woods. A lark with
beautiful tail feathers was singing. You closed your eyes,
listening . . .Although a little breeze was rustling and tumbling
in the woods, you could still hear the sweet lark sing in the
clear air of the day. All of a sudden, a crowd of larks flew
here, you was drowned in the noisy twitters . . .You no longer
knew whether the lark with beautiful tail feathers was still
singing or not . . . ”
Now the lark’s song is submerged in the interference and
is difficult to be detected. Interference or jamming is usually
considered harmful to wireless communications, but it is also
a useful security tool. Cooperative jamming is regarded as a
prevalent physical-layer security approach [14] [15] in wire-
less communication environment. Jammers inject additional
interferences when the transmitter sends messages in order
to interfere the potential eavesdroppers [16] [17] [18] [19].
Sobers et al. [20] [21] employed cooperative jamming to
obtain covert communication. To achieve the transmission
of O(n) bits covertly to Bob over n uses of the channel,
they added a “jammer” to the environment to help Alice
for security objectives. Soltani et al. [22] [23] considered a
network scenario where there are multiple “friendly” nodes
that can generate interference to hide the transmission from
multiple adversaries. They assumed that the friendly nodes are
in collusion with Alice and can determine the closest node to
each warden.
In this work, we consider a large-scale wireless network,
where the locations of potential transmitters form a stationary
Poisson point process (PPP), and their transmission decisions
are made independently (as depicted in Fig. 1). In this sce-
nario, Bob and Willie not only experience noise, but also
interference signal from other transmitters simultaneously.
Since the measure uncertainty of aggregated interference is
greater than the background noise, the uncertainty of Willie
will increase along with the increase of interference. Although
the other transmitters do not collaborate with Alice, and Bob’s
noise increases as well (multiuser interference cancellation
technique [24] is not used), we find that the covert commu-
nication between Alice and Bob is still possible. Alice can
reliably and covertly transmit O(log2
√
n) bits to Bob in n
channel uses when the distance between Alice and Willie
da,w = ω(n
δ/2) (δ = 2/α is the stability exponent). Although
the covert throughput is lower than the square root law and
the friendly jamming scheme, its spatial throughput is higher,
and Alice does not presuppose the location knowledge of
Willie. From the perspective of network, all transmitters in the
network can achieve the same covert throughput with the same
transmit power, and the larger transmit power level does not
increase the probability of being detected since Willie will also
experience a stronger interference. Willie cannot determine
which node is transmitting except he can approach very close
to a certain node (in this occasion the node will find Willie
and stop transmitting). “The sound and the fury” of the noisy
wireless channels make the network a “shadow” network to
Willie.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
1) We considered covert wireless communications in a
network scenario, and established the bound on reliable
covert bits that may be transmitted. We found that the
random interference in a large-scale wireless network
makes the network a “shadow network” to Willie, and
can achieve a high spatial throughput.
2) Leveraging on analysis and simulation results, we pro-
posed practical methods to improve the performance of
covert communications in noisy wireless networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We formulate
the problem and system model in Section II. Next, we study
the covert communication with interference uncertainty in
Section III. We then present the discussions in Section IV
and conclude our work in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, prior to presenting the system model, we give
a running example to illustrate the problem of covert wireless
communications discussed in this paper.
A. Motivating Scenario
Covert communication has a very long history. It is always
related with steganography [25] which conceals messages in
audio, visual or textual content. However, steganography is
an application layer communication technique and is not suit-
able in physical-layer covert communication. The well-known
physical-layer covert communication is spread spectrum which
is using to protect wireless communication from jamming and
eavesdropping [26]. Another kind of covert communications
is network covert channels [27] [28] in computer networks.
While steganography requires some form of content as cover,
the network covert channels require network protocols as car-
rier. In this paper, we consider physical-layer covert communi-
cation that employs the background noise and the aggregated
interference in wireless channels to hide transmission attempts.
Let us take the source location privacy protection in the
Panda-Hunter game [3] as an example. In the Panda-Hunter
Game, a sensor network with a large number of sensors has
been deployed to monitor the habitat of pandas. As soon as
a panda is observed by a sensor, this sensor will store the
observation data, and then report the observations to a sink
via multi-hop wireless channels. However, there is a hunter
(the adversary Willie) in the network who tries to capture the
panda. The hunter does not care the readings of sensors, what
he really cares is the location of the message originator. To find
the message originator near the panda, he listens to a sensor
in his vicinity to determine whether this sensor is transmitting
message. If he finds a transmitter, he then searches for the next
sensor who is communicating with this transmitter. Via this
method, he can trace back the routing path until he reaches
the message originator and catches the panda. As a result,
the source location information becomes critical and must be
protected in this occasion.
To tackle this problem, Kamat et al. proposed phantom
routing techniques to provide source-location privacy from
the perspective of network routing [3]. Phantom routing tech-
niques achieve location privacy by combining flooding and
single-path routing together. From another point of view, the
physical-layer covert communication can provide another kind
of solution to the Panda-Hunter game. If we can hide the
transmission from the hunter in noise and interference of the
noisy wireless channels, the hunter will not able to determine
which sensor is transmitting, and therefore cannot trace back
to the source. What the hunter sees is a noisy and a shadow
wireless network.
B. Channel Model
Consider a wireless communication scene where Alice (A)
wishes to transmit a message to the receiver Bob (B). Right
next to them, a warden Willie (W) is eavesdropping over the
wireless channel and trying to find whether or not Alice is
transmitting.
We adopt the wireless channel model similar to [4] [23],
and throughout this paper we use the similar notations.
We consider a time-slotted system where the time is di-
vided into successive slots with equal duration. All wireless
channels are assumed to suffer from discrete-time AWGN
with real-valued symbols. Alice transmits n real-valued sym-
bols s
(a)
1 , s
(a)
2 , ..., s
(a)
n . The receiver Bob observes the vector
y
(b)
1 , y
(b)
2 , ..., y
(b)
n , where y
(b)
i = s
(a)
i +z
(b)
i , and z
(b)
i is the noise
Bob experiences which can be expressed as z
(b)
i = z
(b)
i,0 +I
(b)
i ,
where {z(b)i,0}ni=1 are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables (RVs) representing the background
noise of Bob with z
(b)
i,0 ∼ N (0, σ2b,0), and {I(b)i }ni=1 are
i.i.d. RVs characterizing the aggregated interference from other
transmitters in the wireless network.
As to Willie, he observes the vector y
(w)
1 , y
(w)
2 , ..., y
(w)
n ,
where y
(w)
i = s
(a)
i + z
(w)
i , and z
(w)
i is the noise Willie
experiences which can be expressed as z
(w)
i = z
(w)
i,0 + I
(w)
i ,
where {z(w)i,0 }ni=1 are i.i.d. RVs representing the background
noise of Willie with z
(w)
i,0 ∼ N (0, σ2w,0), and {I(w)i }ni=1 are
i.i.d. RVs characterizing the aggregated interference Willie
experiences.
Suppose each node in the network is equipped with one
antenna, and Bob and Willie experience the same background
noise power, i.e., σ2b,0 = σ
2
w,0. Besides, different from the
occasion discussed in [23], no location information of Willie
and other transmitters is available in our model.
C. Network Model
Consider a large-scale wireless network, where the locations
of transmitters form a stationary Poisson point process (PPP)
[29] Π = {Xi} on the plane R2. The density of the PPP
is represented by λ, denoting the average number of trans-
mitters per unit area. Suppose each potential transmitter has
an associated receiver, the transmission decisions are made
independently across transmitters and independent of their
locations for each transmitter, and the transmission power
employed for each node are constant power Pt. Any other
channel models with power control or threshold scheduling
will have similar results with some scale factors. Suppose the
wireless channel is modeled by large-scale fading with path
loss exponent α (α > 2). Let the Euclidean distance between
node i and node j is denoted as di,j . For simplicity, let the
channel gain hi,j of channel between i and j is static over the
signaling period, and all links experience unit mean Rayleigh
fading. Then, the aggregated interference seen by Bob and
Willie are the functional of the underlying PPP Π = {Xi}
and the channel gain,
I
(b)
i ≡
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαb,k
hb,k · s(k)i ∼ N (0, σ2Ib ) (1)
I
(w)
i ≡
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαw,k
hw,k · s(k)i ∼ N (0, σ2Iw ) (2)
where each s
(k)
i is a Gaussian random variable N (0, 1) which
represents the signal of the k-th transmitter in i-th channel
use, and
σ2Ib =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαb,k
|hb,k|2 =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαb,k
Ψb,k, (3)
σ2Iw =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαw,k
|hw,k|2 =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαw,k
Ψw,k (4)
are shot noise (SN) process, representing the powers of the
interference that Bob and Willie experience, respectively.
The Rayleigh fading assumption implies Ψi,j = |hi,j |2 is
exponentially distributed with E[Ψi,j ] = 1.
The powers of aggregated interferences, σ2Iw and σ
2
Ib
, are
RVs which are determined by the randomness of the underly-
ing PPP of transmitters and the fading of wireless channels.
Therefore they are difficult to be predicted. Besides, the
closed-form distribution of the interference is hard to obtain
D. Hypothesis Testing
To find whether Alice is transmitting or not, Willie has to
distinguish between the following two hypotheses,
H0 : y
(w)
i = I
(w)
i + z
(w)
i,0 (5)
H1 : y
(w)
i =
√
Pt
dαa,w
ha,w · si + I(w)i + z(w)i,0 (6)
Based on the received vector y = (y
(w)
1 , ..., y
(w)
n ), Willie
should make a decision on whether the received signal is
noise+interference or signal plus noise+interference. We as-
sume that Willie employs a radiometer as his detector, and
does the following statistic test
T (y) =
1
n
yHy =
1
n
n∑
k=1
y
(w)
k ∗ y(w)k > γ (7)
where γ denotes Willie’s detection threshold and n is the
number of samples.
Let D0 and D1 be the events that the received sig-
nal of Willie is noise+interference and Alice’s signal plus
noise+interference, respectively, then the probability of false
alarm and missed detection can be denoted as PFA =
P{D1|H0} and PMD = P{D0|H1}, respectively. Willie
wishes to minimize his probability of error P
(w)
e = (PFA +
PMD)/2, but Alice’s ultimate objective is to guarantee that the
average probability of error E[P
(w)
e ] = E[PFA + PMD]/2 >
1/2− ǫ for an arbitrarily small positive ǫ.
First of all, Willie has to estimate the power level of
noise+interference. The noise z
(w)
i,0 not only comes from the
thermal noise in his receiver but also the environmental noise
from his surroundings. Besides, the aggregated interference
I
(w)
i he sees is a random variable which is determined by
the randomness of the underlying PPP of transmitters and
the channel gains. The only way for Willie to estimate the
noise+interference level is to gather samples. However, he
cannot determine definitely whether the samples he collected
contain Alice’s transmission signal or not.
Besides, Alice should guarantee that the transmission is re-
liable, i.e., the desired receiver (Bob) can decode her message
with arbitrarily low average probability of error P
(b)
e at long
block lengths. For any ǫ > 0, Bob can achieve P
(b)
e < ǫ as
n→∞.
In this paper, we use standard Big-O, Little-ω, and Big-Θ
notations to describe bounds on asymptotic growth rates. The
parameters and notation used in this paper are illustrated in
Table I.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATION WITH INTERFERENCE
UNCERTAINTY IN NOISY WIRELESS NETWORKS
In this section, we first present a theorem on the amount of
information that can be transmitted covertly and reliably over
AWGN channels in a noisy wireless network, then present its
achievability and converse proof.
Theorem 1. Suppose a large-scale wireless network, where
transmission decisions of nodes are made randomly, and the
TABLE I
PARAMETERS AND NOTATION
Symbol Meaning
Pt Transmit power
n Number of channel use
α Path loss exponent
δ = 2/α Stability exponent
Π = {Xi} PPP of potential transmitters
λ Intensity of PPP Π
s
(a)
i Alice’s signal in i-th channel use
s
(k)
i Signal of node k ∈ Π in i-th channel use
z
(b)
i,0 , z
(w)
i,0 (Bob’s, Willie’s) background noise in i-th channel use
σ2b,0, σ
2
w,0 Power of noise (Bob, Willie) observes
I
(b)
i , I
(w)
i Interference (Bob, Willie) observes in i-th channel use
σ2Ib
, σ2Iw Power of interference (Bob, Willie) observes
σ2b , σ
2
w Power of noise plus interference (Bob, Willie) observes
di,j Distance between i and j
hi,j Channel gain of channel between i and j
Ψi,j
Ψi,j = |hi,j |2 is exponentially distributed with
E[Ψi,j ] = 1
N (µ, σ2) Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
PFA Probability of false alarm
PMD Probability of missed detection
E[X] Mean of random variable X
Var[X] Variance of random variable X
q(λ) Outage probability for a typical receiver
τ(λ) Spatial throughput of successful transmissions
locations of transmitters form a PPP on the plane R2. When
the distance between Alice and Willie da,w = ω(n
δ/4), Alice
can covertly and reliably transmit O(log2
√
n) bits to Bob in
n channel uses in the case that α = 4 (δ = 2/α is the stability
exponent). Conversely, if the distance da,w = O(nδ/4), and Al-
ice attempts to send ω(log2
√
n) bits to Bob in n channel uses,
then, as n → ∞, either Willie can detect her transmission
with arbitrarily low probability of error P
(w)
e , or Bob cannot
decode Alice’s message with arbitrarily low error probability
P
(b)
e .
A. Achievability
To transmit messages to Bob reliably, Alice should encode
her messages. In this paper, we use the classical encoder
scheme used in [4] and suppose that Alice and Bob have
a shared secret of sufficient length. At first, Alice and Bob
leverage the shared secret and random coding arguments to
generate a secret codebook. Then Alice’s channel encoder
takes as input message of length L bits and encodes them into
codewords of length n at the rate of R = L/n bits/symbol.
Each codeword is a zero-mean Gaussian random N (0, Pt)
where Pt is the transmit power.
1) Covertness: Alice’s objective is to hide her transmission
attempts from being detected by Willie. If Willie’s probability
of error E[P
(w)
e ] = E[PFA + PMD]/2 > 1/2 − ǫ for an
arbitrarily small positive ǫ, then we can say that the covertness
is satisfied.
Different from the cases studied in [4] [23], Alice and Bob
are located in a noisy wireless network. No location informa-
tion of Willie and other potential transmitters is available, and
Alice cannot collude with other “friendly” nodes. Willie not
only experiences the background noise, but also the aggregated
interference from other transmitters in the network. Therefore
the power of noise and interference Willie experiences can be
expressed as
σ2w = σ
2
w,0 + σ
2
Iw , (8)
where σ2w,0 is the power of the background noise, σ
2
Iw
is the
power of the aggregated interference from other transmitters
(defined in Equ. (4)). In general, the interference is more
difficult to be predicted than the background noise, since
the randomness of aggregated interference comes from the
randomness of PPP Π and the fading channels, especially in
a mobile wireless network.
Let P0 be the joint probability density function (PDF) of
y = (y
(w)
1 , ..., y
(w)
n ) when H0 is true, P1 be the joint PDF of
y when H1 is true. Using the same analysis methods and the
results from [4] [23], if Willie employs the optimal hypothesis
test to minimize his probability of detection error P
(w)
e , then
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
−
√
1
8
D(P1||P0), (9)
where D(P1||P0) is the relative entropy between P1 and P0,
and the lower bound P
(w)
e can be expressed as follows
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtΨa,w
2σ2wd
α
a,w
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtΨa,w
2dαa,w
· 1
σ2w,0 + σ
2
Iw
≥ 1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtΨa,w
2dαa,w
· 1
σ2Iw
. (10)
The last step is due to σ2w,0 << σ
2
Iw
, since in a dense
and large-scale wireless network, the background noise is
negligible compared to the aggregated interference from other
transmitters [30]. Then the mean of P
(w)
e is
E[P(w)e ] ≥
1
2
−
√
n
8
· PtE[Ψa,w]
2dαa,w
·E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
·E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
(11)
for all links experience unit mean Rayleigh fading.
To estimate E[1/σ2Iw ], we should have the closed-form
expression of the distribution of σ2Iw =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαw,k
Ψw,k.
However, σ2Iw is an RV whose randomness originates from
the random positions in PPP Π and the fading channels. It
obeys a stable distribution without closed-form expression for
its PDF or cumulative distribution function (CDF). To address
wireless network capacity, Weber et al. [31] employed tools
from stochastic geometry to obtain asymptotically tight bounds
on the distribution of the signal-to-interference (SIR) level in a
wireless network, yielding tight bounds on its complementary
cumulative distribution function (CCDF). Next we leverage
the bounds on CCDF to estimate the expectation E[1/σ2Iw ].
Define a random variable
Y =
Σi∈ΠPtΨi,wd−αi,w
PtΨa,wd
−α
a,w
=
σ2Iw
PtΨa,wd
−α
a,w
, (12)
then, the lower bound on the CCDF of RV Y, F¯ l
Y
(y), can be
expressed as [31],
F¯ l
Y
(y) = κλy−δ +O(y−2δ), (13)
where κ = πE[Ψδ]E[Ψ−δ]E[d2a,w], λ is the intensity of
attempted transmissions in PPP Π, and δ = 2/α. When
Ψ ∼ Exp(1), κ = πΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1 − δ)d2a,w = π
2δ
sin(πδ)d
2
a,w.
Therefore the upper bound of CDF of Y can be represented
as
FuY(y) = 1− κλy−δ. (14)
Next we can get the upper bound of CDF of σ2Iw as
Fuσ2Iw
(x) = P{σ2Iw < x} = P{PtΨa,wd−αa,wY < x}
= P{Y < x
PtΨa,wd
−α
a,w
}
= 1− κλβδx−δ (15)
where β = PtΨa,wd
−α
a,w. For simplicity, we assume the channel
gain of channel between Alice and Willie is static and constant,
ha,w = 1. Then β can be denoted as β = Ptd
−α
a,w.
Therefore the upper bound of PDF of σ2Iw can be repre-
sented as
fuσ2Iw
(x) = κλβδδx−(δ+1), x ∈ [(κλ)1/δβ,+∞). (16)
where we set x ∈ [(κλ)1/δβ,+∞) to normalize the function
so that it describes a probability density.
Given the upper bound of PDF of σ2Iw , we can upper bound
E[1/σ2Iw ] as follows
E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
≤
∫ ∞
(κλ)1/δβ
κλβδδx−(δ+1) · 1
x
dx
=
δ
δ + 1
(κλ)−1/δβ−1 (17)
Thus, (11) and (17) yield the lower bound of E[P
(w)
e ] as
E[P(w)e ] ≥
1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
·E
[
1
σ2Iw
]
≥ 1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
· δ
δ + 1
(κλ)−1/δβ−1
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· Pt
2dαa,w
· δ
δ + 1
λ−1/δ
(
π2δ
sinπδ
)−1/δ
×d−2/δa,w P−1t dαa,w
=
1
2
−
√
n
8
· δ
2(δ + 1)
(
π2δλ
sinπδ
)−1/δ
· d−2/δa,w (18)
Suppose E[P
(w)
e ] ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0, then we should set√
n
8
· δ
2(δ + 1)
(
π2δλ
sinπδ
)−1/δ
· d−2/δa,w < ǫ. (19)
Let c =
√
1/8 · δ2(δ+1) ( π
2δ
sinπδ )
−1/δ , we have
da,w > (c/ǫ)
δ/2nδ/4. (20)
Therefore, as long as da,w = ω(n
δ/4), we can get
E[P
(w)
e ] ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0. This implies that there is
no limitation on the transmit power Pt of Alice and other
potential transmitters, the critical factor is the distance between
Alice and Willie. This result is different from the works of
Bash [4] and Soltani [23], in which Alice’s symbol power is a
decreasing function of the codeword length n. While this may
appear counter-intuitive, the result in fact is explicable. We
believe the reasons are two folds. First, higher transmission
signal power will create larger interference which will make
Willie more difficult to judge. Secondly, more close to the
transmitter will give Willie more accurate estimation. This
theoretical result is also verified using the experimental results
in Section IV.
2) Reliability: Next, we estimate Bob’s decoding error
probability, denoted by P
(b)
e . Let the noise power that Bob
experiences be
σ2b = σ
2
b,0 + σ
2
Ib (21)
where σ2b,0 is the power of background noise Bob observes,
σ2Ib is the power of the aggregated interference from other
transmitters in the network. By utilizing the same approach in
[4], Bob’s decoding error probability can be lower bounded as
follows,
P
(b)
e (σ
2
b ) ≤ 2
nR−n2 log2
(
1+
Pt
2σ2b
)
= 2
nR−n2 log2
[
1+
Pt
2(σ2
b,0
+σ2Ib
)
]
= 2nR
[
1 +
Pt
2(σ2b,0 + σ
2
Ib
)
]−n/2
≤ 2nR
[
1 +
Pt
2(σ2b,0 + σ
2
Ib
)
n
2
]−1
(22)
where the last step is obtained by the following inequality [23]
(1+x)−r ≤ (1+rx)−1, for any r ≥ 1 and x > −1. (23)
Hence the upper bound of Bob’s average decoding error
probability can be estimated as follows
E[P(b)e (σ
2
b )] ≤ E
[
2nR
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + σ
2
Ib
)−1]
<
∫ ∞
0
2nR
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + x
)−1
fuσ2Ib
(x)dx
= 2nR
∫ ∞
(κλ)
1
δ β
(
1 +
nPt/4
σ2b,0 + x
)−1
×κλβδδx−(δ+1)dx (24)
where fu
σ2Ib
(x) is the upper bound of PDF of σ2Ib which obeys
the similar distribution as σ2Iw (Equ. (16)),
fuσ2Ib
(x) = κλβδδx−(δ+1), x ∈ [(κλ)1/δβ,+∞). (25)
where β = PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b .
Although the interference Bob and Willie observe obey the
similar distribution, they are correlative random variables. This
is because the interference is caused by common randomness
of the PPP Π [32]. When Bob is far away from Willie, the
correlation between σ2Ib and σ
2
Iw
is almost zero, which implies
that the interferences seen by Bob and Willie are approxi-
mately independent. When Bob and Willie are very close to
each other, they experience almost the same interference. In
this occasion, σ2Ib and σ
2
Iw
are approximately identical random
variables.
Let a = nPt/4, the path loss exponent α = 4, then δ = 1/2.
The Equ. (24) can be calculated as follows
E[P(b)e (σ
2
b )] < 2
nR
∫ ∞
(κλ)
1
δ β
(
1 +
a
σ2b,0 + x
)−1
×κλβδδx−(δ+1)dx
= 2nRκλβδδ
[
πa
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
− (26)
2a arctan κλβ
δ√
a+σ2b,0
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
+
2σ2b,0
κλβδ(a+ σ2b,0)
]
As β = PtΨa,bd
−α
a,b , κ =
π2δ
sin(πδ)d
2
a,b =
π2
2 d
2
a,b for δ = 1/2,
when n is large enough, we have
a = nPt/4≫ σ2b,0, a+ σ2b,0 ≈ a. (27)
and
2σ2b,0
κλβδ(a+ σ2b,0)
→ 0 (28)
2a arctan κλβ
δ√
a+σ2b,0
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
>
2σ2b,0
κλβδ(a+ σ2b,0)
(29)
πa
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
→ π√
a
(30)
Therefore we have
E[P(b)e (σ
2
b )] < 2
nRκλβδδ
πa
(a+ σ2b,0)
3/2
< 2nRκλβδδ
2π√
nPt
= 2nR
π2
2
d2a,bλP
1/2
t E[Ψ
1/2]d
−α/2
a,b δ
2π√
nPt
= 2nR
π7/2λδ
2
√
n
(31)
where E[Ψ1/2] = Γ(1 + 1/2) =
√
π/2 for Ψ ∼ Exp(1).
Let E[P
(b)
e (σ2b )] ≤ ǫ for any ǫ > 0, we have
nR ≤ log2
(
2ǫ
π7/2λδ
· √n
)
, (32)
which implies that Bob can receive
L = O(log2
√
n) bits (33)
reliably in n channel uses in the case that α = 4. This may
be a pessimistic result at first glance since it is much lower
than the bound derived in the work of Bash [4], i.e., Bob
can reliably receive O(√n) bits in n channel uses. This is
reasonable because Bob experiences not only the background
noise but also the aggregated interference, resulting lower
transmit throughput. However, in the work of Bash, Alice’s
symbol power is a decreasing function of the codeword length
n, i.e., her average symbol power Pf ≤ cf(n)√n . When Bob
use threshold-scheduling scheme to receive signal, Bob will
have higher outage probability as n → ∞. This is because
Alice’s symbol power will become very lower to ensure the
covertness as n → ∞. If we hide communications in noisy
wireless networks, the spatial throughput is higher than the
work of Bash in which only background noise is considered.
This will be discussed in Section IV.
B. Converse
In this subsection we present the converse of the Theorem.
Suppose Willie make a decision on whether the received
signal includes Alice’s signal based on the received vector
y = (y
(w)
1 , ..., y
(w)
n ). He computes T (y) =
1
ny
Hy =
1
n
∑n
k=1 y
(w)
k ∗y(w)k , and employs a radiometer as his detector
to do the following statistical test with γ as his detection
threshold,
If T (y) < σ2w + γ, Willie accepts H0
If T (y) ≥ σ2w + γ, Willie accepts H1 (34)
where σ2w is the power of noise Willie experiences (defined in
Equ. (8)), and we assume that Willie knows σ2w.
When H0 is true, y
(w)
i = z
(w)
i,0 + I
(w)
i , where z
(w)
i,0 ∼
N (0, σ2w,0) is the background noise, and I(w)i represents the
aggregated interference from other transmitters (defined in
Equ. (2)). The transmitter k ∈ Π sends codewords s(k)i in
the i-th channel use. Willie observes
y
(w)
i ∼ N (I(w)i , σ2w,0) = N
(∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαw,k
hw,ks
(k)
i , σ
2
w,0
)
(35)
which contains readings of mean-shifted noise.
Next we estimate the mean and variance of T (y). At first,
we have to compute the mean and variance of y
(w)
i . Because
the RV Z =
(y(w)i −I(w)i
σw,0
)2 ∼ χ2(1), its mean and variance are
1 and 2, respectively. Hence,
E
[(
y
(w)
i − I(w)i
σw,0
)2]
=
1
σ2w,0
(
E[(y
(w)
i )
2]− 2E[y(w)i I(w)i ] + (I(w)i )2
)
=
1
σ2w,0
(
E[(y
(w)
i )
2]− (I(w)i )2
)
= 1 (36)
yields E[(y
(w)
i )
2] = σ2w,0 + (I
(w)
i )
2. Given this, the mean of
T (y) can be computed as
E[T (y)|H0] = E
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
y
(w)
k ∗ y(w)k
]
= E[(y
(w)
i )
2]
= σ2w,0 +E[(I
(w)
i )
2]
= σ2w,0 + σ
2
Iw . (37)
The last equation comes from the fact that E[(I
(w)
i )
2] =
Var[I
(w)
i ]+(E[I
(w)
i ])
2 = σ2Iw where σ
2
Iw
=
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dα
w,k
Ψw,k.
Because RVs (y
(w)
i )
2 and y
(w)
i are uncorrelated random
variables, the variance of T (y) can be computed in the same
method as follows
Var
[(
y
(w)
i − I(w)i
σw,0
)2]
=
1
σ4w,0
(
Var[(y
(w)
i )
2]− 4(I(w)i )2Var[y(w)i ]
)
=
1
σ4w,0
(
Var[(y
(w)
i )
2]− 4(I(w)i )2σ2w,0
)
= 2 (38)
andVar[(y
(w)
i )
2] = 2σ4w,0+4(I
(w)
i )
2σ2w,0. Hence the variance
of T (y) can be estimated as follows
Var[T (y)|H0] = Var
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
y
(w)
k ∗ y(w)k
]
=
Var[(y
(w)
i )
2]
n
=
1
n
(
2σ4w,0 + 4E[(I
(w)
i )
2]σ2w,0
)
=
1
n
(
2σ4w,0 + 4σ
2
Iwσ
2
w,0
)
. (39)
When H1 is true, Alice transmits a codeword signal which
is included in the signal y that Willie observes. In this
occasion, Willie observes
y
(w)
i ∼ N
(√
Pt
dαw,a
hw,asi + I
(w)
i , σ
2
w,0
)
(40)
∼ N
(√
Pt
dαw,a
hw,asi +
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαw,k
hw,ks
(k)
i , σ
2
w,0
)
Then using the similar method we can derive the following
results,
E[T (y)|H1] = σ2w,0 +
Pt
dαa,w
+ σ2Iw (41)
Var[T (y)|H1] = 1
n
[
2σ4w,0 + 4
(
Pt
dαa,w
+ σ2Iw
)
σ2w,0
]
.(42)
By Chebyshev’s inequality, the probability PFA can be
bounded as follows
PFA = P{T (y) > σ2w + γ}
= P{T (y) > σ2w,0 + σ2Iw + γ}
≤ P{|T (y)− (σ2w,0 + σ2Iw )| > γ}
≤ Var[T (y)|H0]
γ2
=
1
nγ2
(2σ4w,0 + 4σ
2
Iwσ
2
w,0) (43)
and
E[PFA] ≤ 1
nγ2
(
2σ4w,0 + 4E[σ
2
Iw ]σ
2
w,0
)
. (44)
Next we need to estimate the mean of σ2Iw which is the
aggregated interference and is a functional of the underlying
PPP Π. However, its mean is not exist if we employ the
unbounded path loss law (this may be partly due to the
singularity of the path loss law at the origin). We then use
a modified path loss law to estimate the mean of σ2Iw ,
l(r) ≡ r−α1r≥ρ, r ∈ R+, for ρ ≥ 0. (45)
This law truncates around the origin and thus removes the
singularity of impulse response function l(r) ≡ r−α. The
guard zone around the receiver (a ball of radius ρ) can be
interpreted as assuming any two nodes can’t get too close.
Strictly speaking, transmitters no longer form a PPP under
this bounded path loss law, but a hard-core point process in
this case. For relatively small guard zones, this model yields
rather accurate results. For ρ > 0, the mean and variance of
σ2Iw are finite and can be given as [32]
E[σ2Iw ] =
λdcd
α− dE[Ψ]E[Pt]ρ
d−α (46)
Var[σ2Iw ] =
λdcd
2α− dE[Ψ
2]E[P 2t ]ρ
d−2α (47)
where d is the spatial dimension of the network, the relevant
values of cd are: c1 = 2, c2 = π, c3 = 4π/3.
When d = 2, α = 4, constant transmit power Pt, and the
fading Ψ ∼ Exp(1), we have
E[σ2Iw ] =
πλ
ρ2
· Pt (48)
and
E[PFA] ≤ 1
nγ2
(
2σ4w,0 +
4πλ
ρ2
Ptσ
2
w,0
)
. (49)
For any ǫ > 0, Willie can set his threshold
γ =
σ2w,0√
nǫ
√
4πλ
ρ2
Pt + 2σ2w,0 (50)
to satisfy E[PFA] ≤ ǫ.
Because the background noise is negligible compared to
the aggregated interference from other transmitters in a dense
wireless network, Pt ≫ σ2w,0, given c = 2
√
πλσ2w,0/ρ, Willie
can set its detection threshold to
γ = Θ
(
c
√
Pt
n
)
. (51)
Next the PMD can be upper bounded for the given detection
threshold γ in Equ.(51) as follows
PMD = P{T (y) < σ2w + γ}
≤ P
{∣∣∣∣T (y)−
(
σ2w +
Pt
dαa,w
)∣∣∣∣ > Ptdαa,w − γ
}
≤ 1
( Ptdαa,w
− γ)2Var[T (y)|H1] (52)
and its mean can be estimated as
E[PMD] ≤ 1
( Ptdαa,w
− γ)2
1
n
[
2σ4w,0+4
(
Pt
dαa,w
+E[σ2Iw ]
)
σ2w,0
]
.
(53)
Next we assume α = 4, δ = 2/α = 1/2. Since
γ = Θ
(
c
√
Pt
n
)
, E[σ2Iw ] =
πλ
ρ2 Pt, then if da,w = Θ(n
δ/4) =
Θ(n1/8), Willie can upper bound E[PMD] as follows
E[PMD] ≤
2σ2w,0(
Pt√
n
− c
√
Pt
n
)2 1n
[
σ2w,0 + 2
(
Pt√
n
+
πλ
ρ2
Pt
)]
=
2σ2w,0
(
√
Pt − c)2
(
σ2w,0
Pt
+
2√
n
+
2πλ
ρ2
)
. (54)
Consequently, when n→∞ and Pt ≫ σ2w,0, we have
2√
n
→ 0, σ
2
w,0
Pt
→ 0, (55)
and
E[PMD] ≤
4πλσ2w,0
ρ2
1
(
√
Pt − c)2
, (56)
which implies that in the case da,w = Θ(n
δ/4), when Pt ≥(√ 4πλσ2w,0
ǫ′ρ2 + c
)2
, then
E[PMD] ≤ ǫ′ for any ǫ′ > 0. (57)
Hence Alice cannot covertly send any codeword with arbi-
trary transmit power Pt when the distance is da,w = O(nδ/4).
To avoid being detected by Willie, Alice must be certain that
there is no eavesdropper in her immediate vicinity. In the
case that da,w = O(nδ/4), she cannot transmit with arbitrary
transmit power to achieve a higher covert transmission rate
than O(log2
√
n).
IV. DISCUSSIONS
A. Spatial Throughput
The spatial throughput is the expected spatial density of
successful transmissions in a wireless network [31]
τ(λ) = λ(1 − q(λ)) (58)
where q(λ) denotes the probability of transmission outage
when the intensity of attempted transmissions is λ for given
SINR requirement ξ.
In the work of Bash et al. [4], only background noise is
taken into account, Alice can transmit O(√n) bits reliably
and covertly to Bob over n uses of the AWGN wireless
channel. To achieve the covertness, Alice must set her average
symbol power P ≤ cf(n)√
n
. Soltani et al. [22] [23] further
expanded the work of Bash. They introduced the friendly
node closest to Willie to produce artificial noise. They showed
that this method allows Alice to reliably and covertly send
O(min{n, λα/2√n}) bits to Bob in n channel uses when
there is only one adversary. In their network settings, λ is
the density of friendly nodes on the plane R2, and Alice must
set her average symbol power Pa = O( cλα/2√n ) to avoid being
detected by Willie. Thus, given an SINR threshold ξ, σ2b,0 ≥ 1,
and Rayleigh fading with Ψ ∼ Exp(1), the outage probability
of Soltani’s method is
qJ(λ) = P
{
SINR =
PaΨd
−α
a,b
σ2b,0 + PfΨd
−α
a,f
< ξ
}
≥ P{PaΨd−αa,b < ξ}
≥ P
{
cλα/2√
n
Ψd−αa,b < ξ
}
= P
{
Ψ <
1
cλα/2
dαa,bξ
√
n
}
= 1− exp
{
− 1
cλα/2
dαa,bξ
√
n
}
(59)
where Pf is the jamming power of the friendly node, and da,f
is the distance between Alice and the friendly node. Then the
spatial throughput of the network is
τJ (λ) = λ(1 − qJ(λ)) ≤ λ exp
{
− 1
cλα/2
dαa,bξ
√
n
}
. (60)
If we hide communications in the aggregated interference
of a noisy wireless network with randomized transmissions in
Rayleigh fading channel and the SINR threshold is set to ξ,
the spatial throughput is [31]
τI(λ) = λ exp{−πλξδd2a,bΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1− δ)} (61)
where δ = 2/α.
As a result of Equ. (60) and (61), we can state that, by
using a friendly jammer near Willie to help Alice, Alice can
reliably and covertly send O(min{n, λα/2√n}) bits to Bob in
n channel uses, which is higher thanO(log2
√
n) bits when the
aggregated interference is involved. But as n→∞, the spatial
throughput of the jamming scheme τJ (λ) reduces to zero, and
the covert communication hiding in interference can achieve a
constant spatial throughput τI(λ) which is higher than τJ (λ).
Hence, this approach, while has lower covert throughput for
any pair of nodes, has a considerable higher throughput from
the network perspective.
B. Interference Uncertainty
From the analysis above, we found that the interference can
indeed increase the privacy throughput. If we can deliberately
deploy interferers to further increase the interference Willie
experiences and not harm Bob, the security performance can
be enhanced, such as the methods discussed in [20] [21] [22].
Overall, the improvement comes from the increased in-
terference uncertainty. If there is only noise from Willie’s
surroundings, he may estimate the noise level by gathering
samples although the background noise can be unpredictable
to some extent. However, the aggregated interference is more
difficult to be predicted, since the randomness of interference
comes from the randomness of PPP Π and the fading channels.
Fig.2 illustrates this situation by sequences of realizations of
the noise (Normal distribution with the variance one) and
the aggregated interference. From the figure, we find that the
interference has greater dispersion than the background noise,
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Fig. 2. Sequences of 1000 realizations of noise and aggregated interference.
Here a bounded path loss law is used, l(x) = 1
1+‖x‖α
. The transmit power
Pt of nodes are all unity, links experience unit mean Rayleigh fading, Ψ ∼
Exp(1), and α = 4. A reference point is located at the center of a square
area 100m×100m. Interferers deployed in this area form a PPP on the plane
R
2 with λ = 1. Interference the reference point sees is depicted in blue, the
noise is depicted in red.
thus it is more difficult to sample interferences to obtain a
proper interference level.
Additionally, the aggregated interference is always domi-
nated by the interference generated by the nearest interferer.
If an interferer gets closer to Willie than Alice, Willie will be
overwhelmed by the signal of the interferer, and his decision
will be uncertain. Let r1 be the distance of the nearest
interferer of Willie, fR1(r) be the PDF of the nearest-neighbor
distance distribution on the plane R2 [33], then
P{r1 < da,w} =
∫ da,w
0
fR1(r)dr
=
∫ da,w
0
2πλr exp(−πλr2)dr
= 1− exp(−πλd2a,w). (62)
We see that when da,w = 1 and λ = 1, P{r1 < da,w} =
0.9568 - that is, there is a dramatically high probability that
Willie will experience more interference from the nearest
interferer. He will confront a dilemma to make a binary
decision. In a dense and noisy wireless network, Willie cannot
determine which node is actually transmitting if he cannot get
closer than Θ(n2/δ) and cannot sure no other nodes located
in his detect region.
C. Practical Method and Experimental Results
In the proof of Theorem 1, when Willie samples the noise
to determine the threshold of his detector (radiometer), we
presuppose that Willie knows whether Alice is transmitting or
not, and he knows the power level of σ2Iw . In practice, Willie
has no prior knowledge on whether Alice transmits or not
during his sampling process. This implies that Willie’s sample
y
(w)
i follows the distribution
y
(w)
i ∼ N
(√
Pt
dαw,a
h·si1A+
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαw,k
h·s(k)i , σ2w,0
)
, (63)
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Fig. 3. Sequences of 100 Willie’s samples [y
(w)
1 ]
2, ..., [y
(w)
n ]
2 in the cases
that Alice is silent, transmitting, or transmit and silent alternately. T (y) =
1
n
∑n
k=1[y
(w)
k ]
2 in three cases are depicted as three lines. Here a bounded
path loss law is used, l(x) = min{1, r−α}. The transmit power Pt is unity,
links experience unit mean Rayleigh fading, Ψ ∼ Exp(1), α = 4, and
σ2w,0 = 1. Willie is located at the center of a square area 100m×100m. The
distance between Alice and Willie da,w = 1. Interferers deployed in this area
form a PPP on the plane R2 with λ = 1.
where 1A is an indicator function, 1A = 1 when Alice is
transmitting, 1A = 0 when Alice is silent, and the transmission
probability P{1A = 1} = p.
If Alice can transmit messages and be silent alternately,
Willie cannot be certain whether the n samples contain Alice’s
signals or not. To confuse Willie, Alice should not generate
burst traffic, but transforming the bulk message into a smooth
network traffic with transmission and silence alternatively. She
can divide the time into slots, then put message into small
packets. After that, Alice sends a packet in a time slot and
keeps silence for the next slot, and so on. Via this scheduling
scheme, Alice can guarantee that Willie’s samples are the mix
of noise and signal which are undistinguishable by Willie.
Next we provide an experimentally-supported analysis of
this methods. Fig. 3 illustrates an example of sequences of
100 Willie’s samples [y
(w)
1 ]
2, ..., [y
(w)
n ]2 in the case that Alice
is silent, transmitting, or transmitting and silent alternately.
Willie then computes T (y) = 1n
∑n
k=1[y
(w)
k ]
2. Clearly, when
Alice alternates transmission with silence, Willie’s sample
value T (y) will decrease and quite near the value when Alice
is silent. For this reason, the alternation of Alice can increase
Willie’s uncertainty. The transmitted signals resemble white
noise, and are sufficiently weak in this way.
With the same simulation settings of Fig. 3, we evaluate
Willie’s sample values T (y) by varying the transmit power
Pt. As displayed in Fig. 4, the value T (y) changing with Pt
is displayed in three cases, i.e., Alice is transmitting, silent,
as well as transmitting and silent alternately. We find that
when Alice employs the alternation method, Willie’s sample
values decrease, approximating to the case Alice is silent.
Further, the results indicate that higher transmit power cannot
lead to stronger capability for Willie to distinguish Alice’s
transmission behavior. With the transmit power increases,
Willie’s sample values T (y) increase. However, the aggregated
interference increases as well, resulting in the gap of sample
values between Alice’s transmission and silence does not
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Fig. 4. The transmit power Pt versus Willie’s sample values T (y) which
are the average of 100 experiment runs, each with the number of samples
n = 500. During each run of the simulation, to obtain a sample y
(w)
i , a
random wireless network obeying PPP on the plane R2 is generated. Here
the distance between Alice and Willie da,w = 1.
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Fig. 5. The distance between Alice and Willie da,w versus Willie’s sample
values T (y) which are the average of 100 experiment runs, each with the
number of samples n = 500. Here the transmit power Pt = 10, and the
transmission probability p = 0.5.
increase. Consequently, this is consistent with the result of
Theorem 1, which indicates that increasing the transmit power
Pt does not increase the risk of being detected by Willie.
Further, as Theorm 1 states, one of critical factors affecting
covert communication is the parameter da,w, the distance
between Alice and Willie, which should satisfies da,w =
ω(nδ/4) to ensure communication covertly. Fig. 5 illustrates
Willie’s sample values T (y) by varying the distance da,w.
As the results show, when Alice is silent, Willie’s sample
values T (y) barely change since Willie only experiences the
noise and aggregated interference. When Alice is transmitting,
persistence or alteration, Willie’s sample values increase with
decreasing the distance da,w. When da,w ≤ 1, Willie’s sample
values become relatively stable since we employ the bounded
path loss law l(x) = min{1, r−α}.
For the following analysis, we evaluate the effect of the
number of samples n on the distance between Alice and
Willie da,w. We start by comparing Willie’s sample values
by varying n to show the difference in performance. The
results in Fig. 6 shows T (y) with respect to the distance
da,w when n = 1000 and n = 3000. As can be seen,
although the curves of the average T (y) do not change, the
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Fig. 6. The discreteness of Willie’s sample values T (y) versus the distance
da,w when the number of samples n = 1000 and n = 3000. At each
subfigure, three simulation curves are given (from top to bottom): Alice is
transmitting, transmitting and silent alternately (with transmission probability
p = 0.5), and silent completely. For each occasion, given a value da,w and
n, we implement 20 experiment runs to obtain 20 sample values T (y), and
depict the discreteness of T (y) in boxplot form. The width of curves also
represent the dispersion degree of Willie’s sample values.
discreteness of T (y) decreases with increasing the number
of samples n. As to Willie, to detect Alice’s transmission
attempts, he should distinguish the three lines in the picture
with relatively low probability of error. The only way to
decrease the probability of error is increasing the number of
samples. By choosing a larger value for n, Willie’s uncertainty
on noise and interference decreases, hence he can stay far away
from Alice to detect her transmission attempt. As illustrated
in Fig. 6(a), Willie cannot distinguish Alice’s transmission
from silence when he stays at a distance of more than 1
meter to Alice. However, when Willie increases the number
of samples, he can distinguish Alice’s behavior far away. As
depicted in Fig. 6(b), Willie can detect Alice’s transmission at
the distance between 1 and 1.5 meters with low probability
of error. Overall, this experimental result agrees with the
theoretical derivation and conclusion of Theorem 1, i.e., given
the value n, the distance between Alice and Willie should be
larger than a bound to ensure the covertness, and the bound
of da,w increases with the increasing of n, da,w = ω(n
δ/4).
D. Traffic Shaping and Willie’s Sample Dilemma
A practical way for Alice to avoid being detected is lever-
aging traffic shaping [34] as her transmission scheduling such
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Fig. 7. Traffic shaping.
that packet transmission and silence are alternative in time
slots. As depicted in Fig. 7, Alice divides a chunk of data
into packets and transmit each packet in the odd slots. Traffic
shaping may be implemented with for example the leaky
bucket or token bucket algorithm. Traffic shaping used in this
occasion is not to optimize or increase usable bandwidth, it is
used to uniform the transmission of Alice. Although it may
increases the transmission latency, Willie’s uncertainty also
increases.
Willie’s Sample Dilemma: As discussed earlier, when
Willie increases the number of samples, he can distinguish
Alice’s behavior at greater distance. According to Equ. (39)
and (42), a larger quantity of samples of Willie will lead to
smaller variance of T (y)|H0 and T (y)|H1. Hence Willie’s
uncertainty will decrease with the increase of samples. How-
ever, to confuse Willie, Alice can divide the slots sufficiently
small and insert her message in the slots uniformly. When
Willie gathers samples, more samples he collects, more signals
of Alice will be included in his samples. If Willie employs a
radiometer as his detector, it is difficult for him to distinguish
between hypothesesH0 and H1. Therefore, how to determine
the number of samples is a dilemma that Willie has to be
confronted with. As to Alice, her better policy is alternating
transmission and idle periods, that is, “telling a short story in
a long period, speaking for a short time and taking a rest for
a while.”
E. Time Interval and Slow Start
Because Willie employs a radiometer as his detector, to ob-
tain a relatively accurate estimation of noise, he first gathers a
large quantity of samples to determine his detection threshold.
After that, he leverages the threshold to determine whether
Alice is transmitting or not in an interval by comparing the
threshold with the samples in this new interval.
At first, Alice has to determine the proper time intervals
of transmission and idle states. Fig. 8(a) illustrates Alice’s
transmission scheduling with different slot assignments, Fig.
8(b) depicts Willie’s sampling value by varying the distance
between Alice and Willie for different transmission scheduling
schemes. We can find that, if Alice’s transmission slot is
wider than the idle slot, Willie’s sampling value may greater
than his detection threshold with high probability, resulting in
the exposure of Alice’s transmission behavior. When Alice’s
transmission slot is shorter than her idle slot, Willie’s sampling
value may less than his detection threshold, and Willie can
%RE
,GOH 7UDQVPLVVLRQ
6DPSOLQJLQWHUYDO
$OLFH
:LOOLH
,GOH
(a) Alice’s transmission scheduling and Willie’s sampling interval
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
Distance between Alice and Willie
W
illi
e’
s 
Sa
m
pl
in
g 
Va
lu
e
 
 
Sample (p=0.9)
Sample (p=0.5)
Sample (p=0.1)
Threshold (p=0.5)
Threshold (p=0.9)
Threshold (p=0.1)
(b) Sampling Value
Fig. 8. (a) Willie’s sampling interval versus Alice’s transmission scheduling
with the transmission probability p = 0.9, p = 0.1, and p = 0.5 (from top to
bottom). (b) Willie’s sampling value by varying the distance between Alice
and Willie for different transmission scheduling schemes. The threshold is
obtained via a large quantity of samples. The sample is computed through
the sample values in a relative short sampling interval (shown in subfigure
(a)). The width of sample curves represent the dispersion degree of Willie’s
sampling value.
deduce that Alice is in her idle state at this time. Therefore,
the optimal slot assignment method is to set the length of
the transmission slot and idle slot in the same length, i.e.,
p = 0.5. As shown in Fig. 8(b) when p = 0.5, the sampling
values change around the threshold value, making it difficult
for Willie to determine whether Alice is transmitting or not.
Besides, the slot should be as short as possible to make Willie’s
samples contain more Alice’s signal.
Slow Start and Slow Stop: If Alice is transmitting while
Willie is sampling the channel to determine the interference
level and his detection threshold, Willie’s samples will contain
Alice’s signals. If Willie later employs this threshold to test
Alice’s behavior, he will not be able to ascertain Alice’s trans-
mission behavior. However, if Alice is not transmitting while
Willie begins his sampling, Willie’s detection threshold will be
lower than that when Alice is transmitting. Therefore Willie
will have higher probability to find the transmission attempt
when Alice transmits later. Lower transmission probability
implies weaker transmitted signal. As depicted in Fig. 8(b),
Willie’s sampling value with p = 0.1 is much lower than
the sampling value with p = 0.5 but a little higher than that
when Alice is idle. Therefore, to decrease the probability of
being detected, Alice should transmit with lower transmission
probability p = 0.1 from the very beginning, and slowly
increasing until p = 0.5. Conversely, Alice should slowly stop
her transmission in case of being detection when she has no
more messages to transmit further.
In the scene that network traffic is sparse or not evenly
spread in the whole network, the aggregated interference may
be too weak to cover the transmission attempts or unevenly
distributed. In the case of sparse traffic, potential transmitters
should resort to recruiting “friendly” nodes to generate arti-
ficial noise, such as the methods used in [23]. In the case
of uneven traffic distribution, the better way is using some
effective methods, such as routing protocols, to homogenize
the network traffic.
In most practical scenarios, to detect the transmission at-
tempt of Alice, Willie should approach Alice as close as
possible, and ensure that there is no other node located closer
to Willie than Alice. Otherwise, Willie cannot determine which
one is the actual transmitter. But in a wireless network,
some wireless nodes are probably placed on towers, trees,
or buildings, Willie cannot get close enough as he wishes.
Furthermore, wireless networks are diverse and complicated.
If Willie is not definitely sure that there is no other transmitter
in his vicinity, he cannot ascertain that Alice is transmitting.
However, in a mobile wireless network, some mobile nodes
may move into the detection region of Willie, and increase
the uncertainty of Willie. Therefore mobile can improve the
performance of covert communication to some extend.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the covert wireless com-
munication with the consideration of interference uncertainty.
Prior studies on covert communication only considered the
background noise uncertainty, or introduced collaborative jam-
mers producing artificial noise to help Alice in hiding the
communication. By introducing interference measurement un-
certainty, we find that uncertainty in noise and interference
experienced by Willie is beneficial to Alice, and she can
achieve undetectable communication with better performance.
If Alice want to hide communications with interference in
noisy wireless networks, she can reliably and covertly transmit
O(log2
√
n) bits to Bob in n channel uses. Although the covert
rate is lower than the square root law and the friendly jamming
scheme, its spatial throughput is higher as n→∞. From the
network perspective, the communications are hidden in the
noisy wireless networks. It is difficult for Willie to ascertain
whether a certain user is transmitting or not, and what he sees
is merely a shadow wireless network.
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